








Forthcoming in Corporate Citizen: New Perspectives on the Globalized Rule of Law, 




The author asks whether transnational corporate responsibility today ought to be vested in 
legal or natural persons. Three stylized points of view are considered: the welfare 
economist; the corporate counsel; and the human rights victim. With these actors in mind, 
the author addresses several aspects of corporate law and human rights from a transverse 
perspective: the tension between corporate law’s fiduciary duty and tort law’s duty of 
care; the coexistence of parent control and subsidiary autonomy in the global firm; the 
troubling unintended effects for human rights victims of the wholly controlled yet 
autonomous subsidiary; the historical shift from the mono-corporate system to the poly-
corporate system and the subsequent transformation of the flesh-and-blood shareholder’s 
governance responsibility; the ability of today’s companies to transfer or assign legal 
liability for wrongful acts through corporate reorganization, mergers and acquisitions; 
and the depersonalization of responsibility in the today’s poly corporate enterprise. The 
author argues that the ethical and political accountability of decision makers cannot be 
avoided by technical legal fixes that aim to shift responsibility from one entity to another. 
The author shows how today’s global governance “gap” is not a missing piece in the 
puzzle, but a constitutive element of the legal order itself. To illustrate this idea, the 
author reconfigures the global governance “gap” as the void that runs through a toroid (a 
life buoy). The author concludes that corporate responsibility today--as the ethical 
responsibility of flesh-and-blood decision makers--runs from the lowest-level subsidiary 
to the apex of the multinational corporate group. 
 
 
* The author is grateful for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper by Robert C. Clark, Oonagh 
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Today’s demands for corporate responsibility are often joined with the call for 
multinational enterprises to be accountable for their human rights impacts around the 
world. Most prominently, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights state that respecting human rights is a “corporate responsibility.”1 Rather than 
asking what it means for a legal entity “to respect” human rights, the chapter examines 
closely the sense of the term “corporate responsibility” and considers its ethical 
significance for the corporate decision maker and the human rights victim alike. The 
chapter describes how today’s transnational legal order does not adequately capture 
human rights in legal terms as an aspect of corporate responsibility; indeed, the legal 





Sess,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/17/31	(2011)	(the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is “a global 
standard of expected conduct for all businesses” at 13). 
2 Writing in 2001, I observed, “While the global economy has evolved very rapidly to support business 
investment in developing countries, it remains virtually impossible to trace moral and legal accountability 
for industrial harms back to home-country courts. A perplexing and at times alarming divide is evolving in 
law and ethics in the new economy.” Malcolm Rogge, “Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in 
the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, 
Sequihua, and Aguinda” (2001) 36 Tex Intl LJ 36 299 at 317 [Rogge, “Towards Transnational Corporate 
Accountability”]. 
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The global governance “gap,” as this void is often called today, is shown here to be 
constitutive of the global legal order, rather than something absent from it.3 Given the 
persistence of this lamentable state of affairs, it is argued that primacy be given to natural 
persons over legal persons in how we conceptualize corporate responsibility today. As 
ethical responsibility, the corporate responsibility for human rights is vested in the natural 
persons who govern the corporate entity, rather than in the abstract corporate entity. This 
conclusion does not detract from multipronged efforts by victims and their advocates to 
hold multinational corporations legally accountable for violations of human rights; as a 
complement to such efforts, it provides reasons for reflective corporate decision makers 
to choose to govern the legal entities that they control in ways that uphold human rights 
rather than circumvent them.  
 
The starting point for this examination is to fracture the familiar compound term 
“corporate responsibility” into its component parts: “corporate” and “responsibility.” The 
contrast between these unique terms could not be more absolute: the former has a precise 
legal meaning, while the latter’s meaning is truly amorphous. While the corporation is a 
well-defined legal construct, the notion of responsibility has broad legal and ethical 
meanings, neither of which dominates completely our ordinary understanding of the term. 
In a world of multinational enterprises, the nominally autonomous corporation takes its 
place within complex corporate group structures that transcend national boundaries — it 
is in this sense that the loosely used term “transnational corporation” has gained traction 
																																																								
3 As I noted in 2001 (ibid), “Any effort to make transnational corporations more accountable in domestic 
law for harms caused by their operations abroad will benefit from an understanding of how elements of the 
common law do precisely the opposite” (at 314).	
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around the world. But what of “responsibility”? In a world of multinational enterprises, 
are the contours of corporate responsibility jurisdictionally bound, or do they expand with 
the extensive reach of responsibility as understood in its ethical sense? This chapter 
traces a route to understanding the transnational dimension of corporate responsibility as 
the ethical responsibility of natural persons, in particular as it relates to concerns that fall 
within the ambit of human rights.  
  
The route begins by reflecting on a question: what entity or what person ought to be 
regarded as responsible for human rights violations that a multinational enterprise is 
alleged to have caused or contributed to?4 From whom should the victims seek justice? 
The usual answers given, as we shall see, depend on one’s position in relation to the 
matter at hand. Let us consider three very loosely stylized points of view and how they 
diverge and overlap: the value-maximizing welfare economist; the corporate counsel; and 
the human rights victim (often referred to as the rights-holder).  
 
The	Value-maximizing	Welfare	Economist	
The welfare economist who gives priority to shareholder value begins by examining 
whether the impugned outcomes are correctly characterized as negative externalities (i.e., 
pollution, lower property values, habitat loss and so on) and, if so, the appropriate brake 
on the harm is thought to lie in state regulation. Here, the socially responsible corporation 
might be regarded as one that duly follows the rules of the game (including state 
																																																								
4 I adopt the language of “cause or contribute” from the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, supra note 1, Principle 17. 
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regulations and local ethical customs) while seeking to maximize profit.5 By this familiar 
credo, overall social welfare is thought to increase as profit increases,6 while those who 
might be left worse off (the human rights victims) are potentially compensated through 
redistributive tax and transfer policies as well as other compensation mechanisms, such 
as tort law.  
 
The	Corporate	Counsel	
The technically minded corporate counsel might opine that corporate responsibility and 
accountability are synonymous with positive legal liability. From this perspective, a legal 
entity’s responsibility generally arises in three ways: by the demands of state regulation 
(including criminal, environmental and labour laws); by the expectations created in the 
duty of care in tort7; or by obligations that arise from the company’s contracts. By this 
view, the question of whether a business is responsible for something or not can be 
resolved deductively (more or less). Where doubts remain, the conflicting parties might 
call upon courts or arbitrators to settle the matter. But, as we shall see, when it comes to 
human rights, focusing narrowly on avoiding liability misses the forest for the trees. In 
today’s multinational enterprise, legal counsel plays a critical role in shaping the 
																																																								
5 See generally Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, The 
New York Times Magazine (13 September 1970) 32. 
6 See e.g. Reinier Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) (the “most appropriate” interpretation of the 
shareholder value maximization norm reflects the view that “focusing principally on the maximization of 
shareholder returns is, in general, the best means by which corporate law can serve the broader goal of 
advancing overall social welfare” at 23).  
7 See John CP Goldberg, “Tort Law and Responsibility” in John Oberdiek, ed, Philosophical Foundations 
of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) (tort law is “a law of responsibility….It allows 
for persons to be held responsible (or accountable) for having wrongfully injured others” at 17). 
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organization’s ethical culture, including its disposition toward the vexing question of 
human rights responsibility.8  
 
The	Human	Rights	Victim	
The aggrieved human rights victim’s perspective on corporate responsibility is much 
broader than either of those considered above. While the economist is concerned with 
valuing negative or positive externalities, one would be hard pressed to fix a market price 
for the injustice that the human rights victim is forced to bear.9 For the victim, the matter 
of a corporation’s liability is just one of many aspects of corporate responsibility. 
Pursuing justice, the victim may attempt to seek an injunction or constitutional ámparo to 
stop the offending activity altogether; failing that, the cause could be taken to the court of 
public opinion by organizing vigorous protests on the ground.10 The problem here is that 
the human rights victim so often discovers that the search for the vindication of rights 
leads to a dead end — the age-old problem of limited “access to justice.” At scale, we 
find that this common enigma is a global one. Together, many victims stand at the edge 
																																																								
8 See e.g. Ben Heineman, “Implementing Human Rights in Global Business — High Performance with 
High Integrity” in Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan, eds, Business and Human Rights: From 
Principles to Practice (London, UK: Routledge, 2016) 98. See also John F. Sherman III, Rights Respecting 
Corporate Culture, Shift Project, 2019. 
9 Human rights are “non-tradeable” goods. See Lewis A Kornhauser, “Wealth Maximization” in Peter 
Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 3rd ed (London, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998) 679 (“many goods, such as environmental goods and rights to bodily integrity, do not 
trade on well-developed markets if they trade at all” at 680).  
10 See generally Malcolm Rogge, “Ecuador’s Oil Region: Developing Community Legal Resources in a 
National Security Zone” (1997) 14 Third World Legal Stud 233 (describing community lawyering efforts 
within a growing social movement in Ecuador that is putting pressure on the government and transnational 
oil corporations to respect human rights and protect the environment); Malcolm Rogge, “How to Make 
Them Hear: Challenging International Oil Interests in Ecuador’s Amazon Region” (1997) 16:3 Refuge 32 
(describing how environmental and human rights organizations work with local communities to counter 
threats to human rights and the environment that are linked to the operations of national and transnational 
oil corporations). 
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of what some have come to call the “global governance gap.”11 A novel way to visualize 





Corporate liability and corporate responsibility are sometimes viewed synonymously, yet 
it is critical to understand the ways that they diverge. The separation is most apparent 
when differentiating the view within the corporation from the view of the wider world. 
As much as a firm’s decision makers seek to grow value, they seek also to avoid liability. 
In the extremely rare instance where it is necessary to defend a multinational company 
against allegations of human rights violations in court, the lawyer will draw on a familiar 
line of defences, including the common law doctrine of forum non-conveniens (sending 
the case to what is regarded as the more appropriate court) and separate legal 
personality.12 In the more proactive mode, a lawyer might advise corporate decision 
makers about how to operationalize a human rights policy across a firm’s global 
operations. The proactive mode is concerned with both avoiding liability and growing 
																																																								
11 See e.g. Penelope Simons & Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human 
Rights, and the Home State Advantage (London, UK: Routledge, 2014). Research Paper 04-07 (2003); 
Gagnon, Georgette, Audrey Macklin, and Penelope C. Simons. Deconstructing engagement University of 
Toronto, Public Law Research Paper 04-07 (2003). The term first appeared in John Ruggie’s scholarly 
writing with reference to the UN Global Compact. John G Ruggie, “global_governance.net: The Global 
Compact as Learning Network” (2001) 7:4 Global Governance 371 at 377.  
12 See Ashton Phillips, “Transnational Business, the Right to Safe Working Conditions, and the Rana Plaza 
Building Collapse” in Jena Martin & Karen E Bravo, eds, The Business and Human Rights Landscape: 
Moving Forward, Looking Back (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016) (on “forum non 
conveniens as a hurdle to transnational tort claims” at 488); see also Rogge, “Towards Transnational 
Corporate Accountability”, supra note 2. 
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value over the long run by reducing human rights risks to the business and generating 
goodwill. Yet this is no straightforward tick-the-box exercise. In describing efforts to 
implement a global human rights policy at a major extractive industry firm, Sybil 
Veenman, then general counsel of Barrick Gold, acknowledged: “The issues you face are 
unpredictable.”13 One of the reasons that some issues are unpredictable is that in the 
wider world (i.e., beyond the immediate concern of the corporate counsel or manager), 
corporate legal liability is just one aspect of the broader ethical and political demands for 
corporate responsibility and accountability. In this wider, expanded sense, the public’s 
demand for redress is expressed in often unforeseeable ways.14 Take, for example, the 
case of farmers who face irregular and potentially violent removal from their land to 
make way for a mining project. For the aggrieved human rights victims, the search for 
justice may demand that the government and the company abandon their plans to evict 
and resettle the entire village.15 It might demand that the company respect the results of a 
community-led plebiscite over whether or not to permit mining in the region,16 even 
while the government and the company contest the legality of the referendum itself.17 For 
																																																								
13 See Nien-hê Hsieh & Rebecca Henderson, “Putting the Guiding Principles into Action: Human Rights at 
Barrick Gold (A) and (B)” (2016) Harvard Business School Teaching Note 317-015 at 5.  
14 See Matthew Murphy & Jordi Vives, “Perceptions of Justice and the Human Rights Protect, Respect, and 
Remedy Framework” (2013) 116:4 J Business Ethics 781 (in their case study from Guatemala, the authors 
describe the “wide gulf” that separates the community members’ perception of justice from that of the 
company, at 792). 
15 See e.g. Cecilia Jamasmie, “Community opposition forces Newmont to abandon Conga project in Peru” 
(18 April 2016), online: Mining.com <www.mining.com/community-opposition-forces-newmont-abandon-
conga-project-peru/>. 
16 See Mariana Walter & Leire Urkidi, “Community mining consultations in Latin America (2002–2012): 
The contested emergence of a hybrid institution for participation” (2017) 84 Geoforum 265 (over a 10-year 
period, the authors tracked 68 community referenda).  
17 For example, a local judge in Ecuador suspended a pending municipal referendum on whether to prohibit 
mining; days later, the National Elections Council overruled the decision and the referendum was 
reinstated. See “Judge stops local mining referendum”, CuencaHighLife (14 March 2019); “Mining 
referendum reinstated in Girón”, CuencaHighLife (17 March 2019).  
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the lawyers and managers concerned with a firm’s corporate responsibility in the face of 
these calls for justice, fixating on legal liability is myopic. Many business leaders 
themselves are critical of such shortsightedness. For instance, Newmont Mining 
Corporation Chief Executive Officer Gary J. Goldberg warns against taking overly 
legalistic approaches in addressing conflicts with communities. “Don’t depend on the 
law,” he counsels, “…get down and listen to the people and understand what their 
concerns are — that’s critical.”18 The business decision maker’s concern with liability is 
primarily about minimizing roughly estimable legal risks to the business. The wider 
world is concerned about natural persons taking responsibility, and about people being 
accountable for the propriety and consequences of judgments made and decisions taken.  
 
As seen from within the corporation, responsibility has both internally oriented and 
externally oriented aspects. Traditionally, corporate law is concerned with regulating 
internally oriented responsibility. By imposing a fiduciary duty on natural persons who 
hold positions of power within the business organization, corporate law seeks to inculcate 
within them the values of good faith and loyalty in their dealings with other corporate 
constituents.19 These duties are not owed at all to persons who have no formal connection 
to the firm, such as people who live in the surrounding community who may be impacted 
negatively or positively by its activities.20 In showing their fidelity to the corporation and 
																																																								
18 Gary J Goldberg, speech delivered at the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, Opening Plenary 
(New York, 26 November 2018).  
19 See generally David Kershaw, The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary Law 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
20 It remains a matter of debate whether or not the corporate fiduciary duty ought to be extended to allow 
fiduciaries to consider the interests of outside “constituencies.” On the rise and fall of anti-takeover 
“constituency statutes” in the United States, see Nathan E Standley, “Lessons learned from the capitulation 
of the constituency statute” (2011) 4 Elon L Rev 209. In the United Kingdom, under the reformed 
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its shareholders, corporate decision makers may assume a highly adversarial stance 
toward anyone who makes claims about the company’s allegedly harmful external 
impacts. This tendency was cited by John Sherman, former deputy general counsel of 
National Grid and legal adviser to the United Nations Special Representative on Business 
and Human Rights John Ruggie, who regretted that, all too often, “[i]n community 
conflict, lawyers show up and communicate to the other side that they regard the 
community as a legal liability.”21  
 
Quite apart from the internally oriented demands of fidelity that are placed on natural 
persons within the corporation, tort law creates externally oriented duties to people 
outside the corporation. These externally oriented duties fall on both legal and natural 
persons, although in practice, liability tends to fall on the corporation itself. Every 
corporation owes a duty of care to proximate third parties where certain harms are 
foreseeable.22 To avoid liability, it is not enough for companies to comply with 
regulations; decision makers must also take steps to foresee potential risks of harm to 
third parties, and they must take reasonable steps to mitigate or prevent such risks to 
people.23 Tort law has shown some promise for mending the accountability gaps 
																																																								
Companies Act, directors may “have regard” to other constituencies, including “the community and the 
environment,” insofar as doing so promotes the “success of the company.” Companies Act 2006 (UK), c 
46, s 172(1) (duty to promote the success of the company). 
21 John F. Sherman III, remarks at the Inaugural Business and Human Rights Symposium panel discussion 
on “Developments in Business and Human Rights Governance” (Harvard Law School, 13 April 2018) 
(notes on file with the author).  
22 See e.g. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100. 
23 In technical literature on human rights risk management, the uncertainty of outcomes for “rights holders” 
is given the term “risk to people.” See e.g. Deanna Kemp, Sandy Worden & John R Owen, “Differentiated 
social risk: Rebound dynamics and sustainability performance in mining” (2016) 50 Resources Policy 19 at 
24. 
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mentioned earlier, but it has serious limitations, especially with regard to multinational 
enterprises. Such limitations will be considered further below.  
 
So how do the demands of internally oriented fiduciary duties interact with the externally 
oriented demands of the duty of care in tort law?24 The nature of such interactions 
depends, in part, on how the fiduciary duty of loyalty is construed. On this point, 
opinions often collide between the proponents of shareholder and stakeholder 
capitalism.25 Consider the perspective of the hypothetical value-maximizing economist. 
In a strict shareholder-centric interpretation of the duty of loyalty, characterized by some 
as calling for “shareholder primacy” or “value maximization,” management’s role is to 
take steps to prevent or mitigate harm to third parties, insofar as the value of the company 
(and, by extension, shareholder value) may be adversely impacted by rebound effects. By 
this view, the foreseeable risk of harm to people outside the corporation is regarded 
instrumentally inasmuch as it may converge with a risk to the business.26 Such strictly 
instrumentalist interpretations create a moral hazard — after all, preventing harm to third 
parties is not the sole means by which management can reduce material risk.27 The 
																																																								
24 The duty of care in tort law is distinct from the corporate duty of care; however, they have common 
origins. See Robert J Rhee, “The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment” (2012) 88 
Notre Dame L Rev 1139. 
25 On debates over the corporate fiduciary duty as construed within the “property” or “social entity” theory 
of the corporation, see William T Allen, “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation” 
(1992) 14 Cardozo L Rev 281; see also Lynn A Stout, “Why we should stop teaching Dodge v. Ford” 
(2008) 3 Va L & Bus Rev 163. I provide a detailed account of the shareholder versus stakeholder debate in 
Malcolm Rogge, Bringing Corporate Governance Down-to-Earth, from Culmination Outcomes to 
Comprehensive Outcomes in Shareholder and Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Responsibility Initiative 
Working Paper No. 72, April 2020.  
26 For an insightful discussion about such convergence, see John F Sherman III & Amy K Lehr, “Human 
Rights Due Diligence: Is It Too Risky?” (2010) CSR Journal.  
27 See Björn Fasterling, “Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk Management: Social Risk Versus Human 
Rights Risk” (2017) 2:2 Business & Human Rights J 225 (suggesting that companies that “excel in social 
risk management could — in extremis — increase risks to right-holders” at 243). 
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company might choose to move operations into jurisdictions where there is less 
likelihood of facing a tort claim.28 Litigation avoidance is never likely to be the sole 
reason for moving operations; nonetheless, in some sectors, concerns over liability are 
seen to play an important role.29 The first point to be taken here is that the broad notion of 
corporate responsibility has asymmetrical internal and external dimensions,30 and that 
these dimensions are, at times, in tension with one another. The second point is that the 
corporate fiduciary duty concerns solely the responsibility of natural persons, while the 
duty of care in tort law concerns the responsibility of both legal persons (corporations) 




Consider now the very significant limitations of tort law for addressing today’s much 
lamented global governance gap. The history of transnational tort litigation over human 
rights violations involving parent companies in Canada, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States has been well documented by others and will not be 
																																																								
28 See Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
(arguing that the multinational enterprise is structured to minimize “regulatory burdens” and “maximize 
operational flexibility” at 52). 
29 As Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman noted almost two decades ago: “Already, strong empirical 
evidence indicates that increasing exposure to tort liability has led to the widespread reorganization of 
business firms to exploit limited liability to evade damage claims.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
“Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts” (1991) Yale LJ 1879 at 1881. 
30 Using similar language, Tara Van Ho calls for an “externalised locus” (i.e., a focus on the interests of 
people who are external to the corporation) in human rights due diligence. Tara Van Ho, “‘Due Diligence’ 
in ‘Transitional Justice States’: An Obligation for Greater Transparency?” in Jernej Letnar Cernic & Tara 
Van Ho, eds, Human Rights and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability for Human Rights (Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2013) at 232. 
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repeated here.31 There have been some qualified successes for human rights victims, and 
yet a sober assessment of the global jurisprudence shows that transnational tort lawsuits 
are extremely difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion and take a heavy toll on the 
victims and their advocates. Significant advances are often followed by retreats.32 Long 
odds aside, the victim may nonetheless decide to bring a lawsuit against a parent 
company in the home state as part of a wider campaign for corporate accountability.33 
The evident shortcomings of tort law as a human rights remedy provide further 
motivation for the wider world’s call for corporate responsibility to extend beyond what 
the law actually requires. And yet, from the perspective of our hypothetical corporate 
counsel, who considers that value seeking goes hand in hand with liability avoidance, the 
overwhelming difficulties faced by the tort claimants might be regarded as evidence of 
legal “success” for the enterprises involved.  
 
																																																								
31 For excellent surveys of transnational tort cases and the great challenges that litigants face, see Gwynne 
Skinner, Robert McCorquodale & Oliver De Schutter (with case studies by Andie Lambe), The Third 
Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (Brussels & 
London, UK: International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, CORE & European Coalition for 
Corporate Justice, 2013); Michael D Goldhaber, “Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-US Courts: A 
Comparative Scorecard” (2013) 3 UC Irvine L Rev 127; Francois Larocque, “Recent Developments in 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation: A Postscript to Torture as Tort” (2008) 46:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 6; 
Judith Schrempf-Stirling & Florian Wettstein, “Beyond Guilty Verdicts: Human Rights Litigation and its 
Impact on Corporations’ Human Rights Policies” 145:3 J Business Ethics 545; Audrey Mocle & Yousuf 
Aftab, “Business and Human Rights as Law: Towards Justiciability of Rights, Involvement and Remedy” 
(2019) LexisNexus Canada 19. A substantial database of current cases is produced by the Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre. 
32 In a February 2020 decision widely heralded as a significant advance, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that customary international law’s prohibitions against slavery, forced labour, crimes against humanity and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are automatically adopted into Canadian law and “potentially 
apply” to the defendant corporation. See Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5, at para 116 (). 
Nonetheless, the court’s decision pertained to a preliminary motion only, leaving much uncertainty for all 
parties as the various points of law will be worked out in continuing litigation.  
33 For two notable cases from Canada, see Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc 2013 ONSC 1414 [Choc v 
Hudbay] (allegations of violent attacks by company security); Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc, 2017 BCCA 
39 (settled in 2019) (allegations of violent repression of protesters by company security).  
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For the human rights victims and their advocates, the formidable barriers to obtaining 
remedy are seen as prime instances of the global governance gap; for defending 
enterprises, such barriers represent the legal order functioning precisely as it should. 
Using the basic building blocks of corporate law to shield one related entity from another, 
the corporation, with the help of its lawyers, is able to erect robust architectural defences 
against liability.34 The use of such defensive structures is scaled across the global 
corporate system.35 The champions of today’s corporate law regard its “entity shielding” 
function as economically and socially efficient.36 Its critics argue that existing law 
increasingly gives licence to corporate irresponsibility.37 The two positions seem 
irreconcilable. Yet there is another way to depict this impasse that accommodates both 
points of view. This picture is drawn by the impartial spectator38 who characterizes the 
global governance gap as the void in a toroid (for example, the hole in a lifebuoy), rather 
than a missing piece in a puzzle. 
																																																								
34	See	Penelope	Simons, International law's invisible hand and the future of corporate accountability for 
violations of human rights, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 3.1 (2012): 5-43 (“Under 
domestic corporate/company laws, corporate actors may legitimately use a subsidiary in order to shelter the 
parent company and other members of a corporate group from activities that may attract legal liability” at 
32). See also Simons and Macklin, supra note 11, at 8. 	
35 In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means observed the emergence of a “corporate system” in America: 
“The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing 
economic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a ‘corporate system’ 
— as there was once a feudal system — which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and 
powers, and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social institution.” 
Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
MacMillan, 1932) at 10.  
36 On the essential role of “entity shielding” in corporate law, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & 
Richard Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm” (2005) 119:5 Harv L Rev 1333 at 1335; see also Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2000) 89 Geo LJ 439 (arguing 
that a global convergence toward the efficient shareholder primacy model is observable and will persist). 
37 On how corporate law rules are increasingly used for liability avoidance, see Lynn M LoPucki, “The 
Death of Liability” (1996) 106:1 Yale LJ 1. 
38 I borrow the term “impartial spectator” from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).  





       
Source: YassineMrabet (Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA).  
 
Figure 1: The unbroken lines of the grid trace the contours of a coherent, intact and predictable “Weberian” 
logical rational legal order. The global governance gap is shown as the void that runs through the centre of 
the lifebuoy. The gap is not a missing piece in the grid; rather, it is a constitutive element of the legal order 
itself. The global governance gap is instantiated by the presence of law rather than its absence. 
 
In this characterization, the unbroken grid that runs along the toroidal surface of the 
lifebuoy represents the seamless and rational legal order: limited liability, separate legal 
personality and the doctrine of forum non-conveniens are just a few of its well-oiled 
components.39 For the lawyer who represents a multinational enterprise, the grid 
represents a coherent, intact and predictable system of law that may be used creatively to 
																																																								
39 On Max Weber’s (much contested) notion of a logical rational legal order as complete system of law, see 
Duncan Kennedy, “The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or: Max Weber’s 
Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought” (2003) 55:5 Hastings 
LJ 1031.  
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shield the parent entity from its subsidiary’s liabilities, but not to commit a fraud or 
merely as a sham.40 This reasonably stable and predictable legal order has been replicated 
around the globe to undergird the development of market economies. The system lends 
distinct advantages and disadvantages to different actors depending on where they are 
situated: the corporations and their shareholders are firmly fixed to the toroid’s grid, 
while the human rights victims drift in the void that runs through it. Politically speaking, 
reforming the legal order is not so easily achieved, if it means creating more litigation 
risk and legal uncertainty for businesses and shareholders. This is because truly 
transformative initiatives will be met with resistance from those players who find 
advantage in maintaining the status quo.41 Recognizing this challenge does not mean that 
efforts to reshape the legal order so that human rights victims are brought out of the void 
should be abandoned.42 Inventive and bold proposals and actions for transformation are 
needed today. The purpose of this chapter is not to spell out a defined program for 
reform; rather, it is to contribute to our growing understanding of the transnational, 
global, structural and systemic character of the barriers that human rights victims face.43 
																																																								
40 LoPucki, supra note 39, argues that such efforts have led to the “death of liability.”  
41 For example, Simons discusses how lobbyists succeeded in thwarting legal reform efforts in Canada 
aimed at increasing corporate accountability for extraterritorial harms. See Simons, supra note 34, at 31. 
See also Simons and Macklin, supra note 11, at 260-270 (on failed legislative initiatives in Canada, U.S., 
Australia and U.K.).  
42 One proposed reform is that courts recognize “a common law duty of care of business to exercise human 
rights due diligence.” See Douglass Cassel, “Outlining the case for a common law duty of care of business 
to exercise human rights due diligence” (2016) 1:2 Business & Human Rights J 179 (in presenting his case 
for the responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence, the author argues that “parent companies 
should exercise [human rights] due diligence with regard to all entities in the ‘enterprise’ or ‘enterprise 
group,’ including their subsidiaries” at 186). 
43 In a similar vein, Simons draws on Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and feminist 
critiques of international law to expose the ‘structural’ aspect of the global governance gap, concluding 
that, “…one of the most significant impediments to corporate human rights accountability is the structure 
of the international legal system itself.” Supra note 34, at 11-12. On ‘systemic’ approaches to addressing 
the governance gap, see Simons and Macklin, supra note 11, at 13-15.  
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The following section considers several of the corporate law aspects of such barriers in 
more detail.  
 
Corporate	Responsibility	in	a	Poly-corporate	System	
Today’s corporate system is comprised of vast constellations of separately incorporated 
entities that are organized into poly-corporate groups.44 The answer to the question of 
whether corporate responsibility vests in natural or legal persons within this complex 
system is muddled by the coexistence of parent control and subsidiary autonomy with 
respect to each of the legally separate corporate entities within a corporate group. What 
does it mean to say that control and autonomy coexist in related entities? In their 1972 
study on multinational enterprises, John Stopford and L. T. Wells concluded that the need 
“for control over decisions in foreign subsidiaries is the common element that has led 
certain kinds of firms to prefer to conduct their overseas operations through wholly 
owned entities.”45 Typically, the parent company in the home country (the domicile of 
the parent company) will be shielded from liability by several layers of intermediary 
subsidiaries that are domiciled in yet another jurisdiction (often in tax havens such as 
Bermuda or the Cayman Islands). The precise structures vary almost infintely in their 
details.46 Each limited liability company in the group plays a function within the larger 
																																																								
44 José Engrácia Antunes distinguishes today’s poly-corporate group enterprises from the mono-corporate 
entities that existed prior to legal reforms of the late nineteenth century. José Engrácia Antunes, Liability of 
Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in Parent-Subsidiary Relationships in US, German and EU 
Law: An International and Comparative Perspective (New York: Springer, 1994). 
45 John M Stopford & LT Wells Jr, Managing the Multinational Enterprise: Organization of the Firm and 
Ownership of the Subsidiary (New York: Basic Books, 1972) at 123.  
46 For example, in 2007, the Boeing Company had 282 subsidiaries incorporated in dozens of jurisdictions, 
including the British West Indies, China, Delaware, Manitoba and the Netherlands. In 2009, Deutsche Bank 
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whole. To the outsider, it may seem paradoxical that the law treats the subsidiary 
corporations within the group as autonomous entities, but for corporate counsel and 
management, this picture is very natural. The parent company exerts central control over 
the enterprise as an economic entity, while the subsidiaries retain legal and operational 
autonomy within the bounds of the policies and strategies that are set from above. While 
every firm’s structure is unique, some degree of central control is essential for fulfilling 
its economic function as a vehicle for investment. In a multinational enterprise, the 
economic gain structure must be protected against threats that occur within and across 
national jurisdictions; the firm addresses such problems through its enterprise risk 
management strategy.47 The troubling effects of the wholly controlled yet autonomous 
subsidiary come to light when people entirely outside the corporation are harmed by one 
or more of the entities within the corporate group. This is because a degree of legal 
autonomy may be given to each subsidiary entity by the controlling parent — a strategic 
and defensive separation of powers and liabilities among legal persons occurs. The 
outsiders who are harmed soon find that the subsidiary’s seemingly paradoxical wholly 
																																																								
AG operated in 56 countries, with 1,954 subsidiaries. In 2011, Newmont Mining Corporation had 206 
subsidiaries incorporated in more than 30 jurisdictions, including Bermuda, Delaware, Guinea, Honduras, 
Jersey, Papua New Guinea and Peru. 
47 See Latin American Companies Circle, Corporate Governance Recommendations for Company 
Groups— Based on Experiences from the Latin American Companies Circle (Latin American 
Companies Circle, with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, IFC World 
Bank & Swiss Confederation, 2014) (containing the following recommendations regarding group-
wide (enterprise) risk management: “Based on best practice, for a conglomerate-wide risk oversight 
a Board of Directors of a holding company should at least (i) conduct ongoing mapping and 
monitoring of risks across all group companies; (ii) establish risk appetite for the entire corporate 
group; and (iii) ensure an effective risk management system has been implemented across the 
conglomerate. Should a Board deem it convenient, it could delegate these functions in a Board-level 
risk management committee” at 6).  
	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570105
In	Press	-	Revised	April	19,	2020		
	 19	
controlled autonomy is just one more cryptogram to be solved in their quest for corporate 
responsibility.48  
 
Today, the human rights victims who clamour for corporate accountability strive to hold 
the multinational enterprise responsible as a unified whole, as a unified brand. Facing 
such clamour, firms frequently use the defensive strategy of keeping the conflict 
geographically and legally local. In practice, this means that decision makers in the 
parent company and in the intermediary subsidiaries avoid becoming directly involved in 
the local dramas as they unfold — they are counselled to focus on policy matters while 
delegating decision making about operational matters to managers who are working “on 
the ground.”49 Such delegation serves to maintain the formal separateness of the many 
related legal entities that comprise the corporate group. The advantage in keeping a 
dispute legally local is one among many reasons why the parent grants the wholly owned 
subsidiary such autonomy. But there may be unintended consequences to this formalistic 
division of labour in decision making. The victims may begin to see the enterprise as an 
organization that thrives in contradiction. Unimpressed by the local subsidiary’s status as 
a separate legal entity, the outsiders demand accountability from the parent company and 
its shareholders, regardless of where they are based. The formalities of legal separateness 
have little salience for the human rights victim who demands ethical and political 
																																																								
48 On the issue of control and autonomy with regard to harms alleged to have been caused by Royal Dutch 
Shell’s subsidiaries operating in Nigeria, see Sheldon Leader et al, “Corporate Liability in a New Setting: 
Shell & the Changing Legal Landscape for the Multinational Oil Industry in the Niger Delta” (2011) Essex 
Business and Human Rights Project, University of Essex. 
49 See Martin Lipton, Sabastian V Niles & Marshall L Miller, “Risk Management and the Board of 
Directors”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (28 July 2015).  
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accountability from the natural person or persons whom they regard as responsible for the 
harm.  
 
So, what changed? How is corporate responsibility in today’s poly-corporate system 
different from the way it used to be? The difference lies in the changed relationship of the 
legal person — the corporate entity — to the natural persons who were traditionally 
responsible for it. The storied joint-stock charter companies of the pre-modern era were 
mono-corporate entities (the East India Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company were 
sole entities); in contrast, today’s multinational enterprises are poly-corporate 
structures.50 The modern poly-corporate structures were introduced in the late 1800s 
when the State of New Jersey became the first jurisdiction in the world to allow a 
corporation to own shares in another corporation.51 In short order, “parent” corporations 
became the sole or controlling shareholders of their “daughter” and “granddaughter” 
corporations (what we now refer to as subsidiaries). New Jersey lawyers set out to devise 
complex “holding company” structures. This legal innovation was quickly adopted in 
neighbouring US states and eventually worldwide, giving rise to the multinational 
enterprises that are now ubiquitous.  
 
The shift from the mono-corporate system to the poly-corporate system transformed the 
nature of the shareholder’s governance responsibility. In the pre-modern era, the flesh-
and-blood shareholder (a natural person) was given the governance responsibility to cast 
																																																								
50 See Antunes, supra note 46. 
51 See Ralph Nader, Mark J Green & Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: Norton, 
2007) at 43–46. 
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votes in fundamental corporate decisions, such as electing board members, approving a 
merger, or changing the corporation’s bylaws. In the poly-corporate regime, share voting 
was transformed into a function that could be carried out by the corporation itself (by the 
legal person). This, of course, was a highly formalistic innovation. Practically speaking, 
some natural person had to cause the corporation to cast its votes, so the board of 
directors took on this role. In today’s poly-corporate groups, each operating and 
intermediary subsidiary corporation might have a sole board member who acts as the 
entity’s legal representative. It is not uncommon that the sole board member of each 
intermediary subsidiary in a group is the same natural person, who, as it happens, also sits 
on the board of the ultimate parent company.52 To maintain the legal separateness of the 
many subsidiary companies that are combined in this manner, it is essential that 
administrative formalities such as voting at annual meetings be attended to assiduously.53 
The traditionally human responsibility to vote shares is exercised in poly-corporate 
groups by what are essentially a series of clerical manoeuvres that cause the many layers 
of subsidiaries to act in predictable ways.54 Such manoeuvres are regarded as perfectly 
normal by the economist, the general counsel and management. But for the human rights 
victim, a very troubling aspect arises from this regime: while the victim may have a clear 
sense of the person who ought to be held responsible for a wrongful act, legal liability for 
that wrongful act may be transferred or assigned through corporate reorganization, 
mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, by such transactions, the ultimate responsibility for 
																																																								
52 In some jurisdictions, this individual is known as the subsidiary’s “administrator.”  
53 On this requirement in Delaware law, see Sea-Land Services, Inc v The Pepper Source, 941 F (2d) 519 
(7th Cir 1911).  
54 We might call this a form of digitalized responsibility, in contrast to the traditionally analogue function 
of voting shares by raising one’s hand. By clerical manoeuvres, the digitalized vote propagates through the 
system of separate entities within a corporate group. 
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governing the firm is shifted from one group of shareholders to another. In poly-corporate 
groups, these shareholders might be legal entities rather than natural persons. From an 
ethical point of view, such transfers of responsibility might well be regarded as arbitrary.  
 
When it comes to governance responsibility, a world of difference lies between the 
human share-voter and the share-voting corporate entity. According to Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means, “The typical business unit of the 19th century…was owned by 
individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the 
main, limited by the personal wealth of the individuals in control.”55 In becoming 
shareholders, these individuals took on the personal responsibility for governing the 
corporation; they could be held ethically accountable, albeit not legally accountable, for 
any harms caused by the corporation they governed.56 While their liability for the 
corporation’s debts was limited, they were nonetheless accountable in the sense that they 
were participants in the local community and in political life.57 This marriage of personal 
and corporate responsibility was short lived, as the corporation underwent a dramatic 
																																																								
55 See Berle & Means, supra note 37 at 2. For the English history of the same period, see Ron Harris, 
Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720–1844 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Faith Stevelman, “Global Finance, Multinationals and Human 
Rights: With Commentary on Backer’s Critique of the 2008 Report by John Ruggie” (2011) 9:1 Santa 
Clara J Intl L 101 (“The hydra-like structure of holding companies owning subsidiaries, and subsidiaries of 
subsidiaries-creating compounding layers of bureaucracy and plausible deniability was an organizational 
impossibility in the first few decades of the twentieth century” at 129). 
56 I refer to civil matters rather than criminal ones, which may attract personal liability. By drawing this 
distinction between old and new, I do not mean to imply that the sole-entity corporations of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries were inherently more virtuous than businesses today. They were not.  
57 Berle and Means give the example of the “first important manufacturing enterprise” in the United States 
that was organized as a corporation: the Boston Manufacturing Company. This company was incorporated 
in 1813 with 11 shareholders. The number of stockholders increased to 76 by 1830 and to 123 by 1850. In 
1842, stock in the Merrimack Corporation (also in Massachusetts), was held by 390 people, including 80 
administrators or trustees, 68 females, 52 retired businessmen, 46 merchants, 45 manufacturers and 
mechanics, 40 clerks, students and unspecified, 23 lawyers, 18 physicians, 15 farmers and three 
institutions. See Berle & Means, supra note 37 at 11–12.  
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transformation in scale beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. As the number of 
shareholders grew into the hundreds and then thousands, any sense of personal 
responsibility and accountability for the corporation’s activities was diluted. In many of 
today’s multinational corporate groups, the number of shareholders has expanded by 
orders of magnitude. 
 
In both public and privately held corporate groups today, one finds multiple intermediary 
parent-subsidiary relationships — each parent takes on governance responsibility for its 
subsidiary companies, and so on down the chain. The share-voting parent or intermediary 
corporation can, in turn, be bought and sold, merged into or out of another firm, or 
transferred in an almost infinite number of ways. By such transactions, the governance 
responsibility for a single corporate entity can be shifted in almost any direction. 
Responsibility qua liability can also be transferred or assigned as needed. The point to be 
taken here is that in a corporation many aspects of responsibility are depersonalized; they 
rest in the abstract legal entity, rather than in the specific natural persons who make 
specific decisions on its behalf. Again, this is all very natural from the corporate 
perspective. In deals involving “sophisticated” parties, be they lenders, suppliers, clients, 
investors or joint venture partners, shifting responsibility in this way poses little worry. 
The contracting parties will ensure ex ante that appropriate pathways to responsibility 
qua liability are present; such efforts fall within their governance responsibility to 
conduct due diligence. In a merger or acquisition, the parties to the transaction may 
stipulate which entity inherits the liability for pending litigation or other specified risk, 
such as latent environmental liability. By such rules, it is possible that an acquiring firm 
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may find itself defending a contentious and politically damaging lawsuit for actions that 
were taken by the predecessor company.58 While it’s perfectly normal to transfer 
governance responsibility and responsibility qua liability among corporate entities this 
way, the decision maker’s ethical responsibility for the choices they make is not normally 
regarded as transferable or assignable in this sense.59 One has to live with the decisions 
one makes, even if one is not, strictly speaking, liable for them.  
 
For consenting parties in a corporate transaction, attributing responsibility qua liability is 
a technical matter; it is a problem that can be solved deductively (more or less). The 
situation is very different for the non-consenting human rights victim who stands outside 
such transactions altogether. From the victim’s perspective, the attribution of corporate 
responsibility is not a “merely technical” matter.60 When it comes to the firm’s 
responsibility to the outside world for human rights violations, the ethical and political 
accountability of decision makers cannot be avoided by technical legal fixes that aim to 




58 In Choc v Hudbay (supra note 35), the allegations brought by the plaintiffs refer to the harmful acts of a 
predecessor company, Skye Resources. After the lawsuit began, the defendant, Hudbay Minerals Inc., sold 
the mine site in question (the Fenix mine) to Solway Investment Group, a Swiss company, while retaining 
liability in the lawsuit. 
59 The point is made clear by analogizing to criminal law — the criminal law does not permit an accused 
person to transfer potential criminal liability or a conviction to another person.  
60 I adapt the term “merely technical” from Duncan Kennedy’s analysis of the “politics of contract 
technicality.” Duncan Kennedy, “The Political Stakes in ‘Merely Technical’ Issues of Contract Law” 
(2002) 10 Eur R Priv L 7 at 7. 





This brings us back to the original question: what natural person or legal entity in a 
corporate group ought to be held responsible for human rights violations? The foregoing 
analysis suggests that the answer depends very much on one’s positional point of view: 
the economist, manager and general counsel will tend to vest corporate responsibility in 
the legal entity itself, while the human rights victim will tend to regard natural persons 
who control such entities as ultimately responsible for the injuries they endure. The 
translation of the demands of responsibility from one positional point of view to the other 
is not so straightforward; indeed, we might ask whether it is even possible.61 
 
What does all of this mean in practice? One hypothesis that can be drawn from the 
foregoing analysis is that the relative ease of shifting both responsibility qua liability and 
governance responsibility from one person (legal or natural) to another comprises an 
aggravating factor when human rights are at stake in localized conflicts. For instance, 
such aggravation may occur when a business that is thought to be responsible for causing 
or contributing to some human rights harm suddenly changes hands. In a multinational 
enterprise, the decision to sell is likely made by the parent company or intermediary 
company, which might be based in another country. For the companies involved, this is 
an entirely normal business transaction. Yet here the enterprise might appear to the 
human rights-holder as double-faced. How so? At the same time that the legally separate 
																																																								
61 On “regime collisions” and the fragmentation of global law, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther 
Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law” 
(2004) 25:4 Mich J Intl L 999.  
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parent company disavows external responsibility (qua liability) for any harms that are 
allegedly caused by the local subsidiary’s activities, it fully embraces the internal 
governance responsibility to direct and control the sale of that subsidiary. This seemingly 
paradoxical stance arises from the coexistence of control and autonomy discussed earlier. 
For the human rights victim, the situation may give rise to great uncertainty and serious 
concern about being left worse off and without any remedy. After all, the acquiring firm 
might have a less generous view of its social responsibility; it may have little regard for 
the “corporate responsibility to respect human rights,” or for the requirement to conduct 
human rights due diligence under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights.62 Rightly or wrongly, the human rights-holders may interpret such actions as 
calculated avoidance of corporate responsibility.  
 
Consider another example: in the course of a delicate and lengthy negotiation between 
community representatives and mining company representatives, the company involved 
is well within its legal right to sell its interest in the project without consulting the 
affected community.63 Needless to say, we can see how community trust is difficult to 
earn when, without notice, the foreign parent company simply sells the project and exits 
the problem altogether. For this reason, some community representatives might refuse to 
engage in dialogue with the company at all, preferring instead to meet with high 
																																																								
62 In its 2019 report, the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark found it “particularly alarming” that “nearly 
half of the companies assessed (49%) score 0 across all indicators related to the process of human rights 
due diligence.” Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, “Key Findings, 2019”, online: 
<corporatebenchmark.org>. 
63 For example, in the middle of a long-standing company-community conflict in Guatemala between 
Xinka indigenous people and Tahoe Minerals (a Canadian mining company), the parent company sold the 
mine to another firm, Pan American Silver. See Justice and Corporate Accountability Project, “Request to 
Investigate Failure to Disclose Material Information”, Osgoode Hall Law School (3 January 2019).  
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government officials — after all, the state is unable to transfer or assign its political 
responsibility to some other party.64 At the local level, the rights-holders might be told to 
take their grievances to a “communities team” or a corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
committee that operates out of the local subsidiary.65 But determined local leaders may 
not be satisfied by these low-level contacts. And this might help to explain why 
community representatives from host countries such as Ecuador, Guatemala and Papua 
New Guinea have made the long journey to shareholder meetings in other countries. They 
travel abroad to demand corporate accountability from the very natural persons they 
believe are ultimately responsible for the abuses on the ground.  
 
Today’s globalized poly-corporate law makes the human rights victim’s quest for 
corporate responsibility exceedingly difficult. This chapter has argued that the global 
governance “gap” is not a missing piece in the puzzle, but a constitutive element of the 
legal order itself. Just how to neutralize this detrimental feature of the legal order is a 
matter of vigorous ongoing debate between those who call for an overarching 
international treaty on human rights and business,66 and those who push for greater 
“policy coherence” through the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on 
																																																								
64 For example, in the decades-long company-community conflict that was the subject of the Copper Mesa 
Mining Corp v Ecuador investment arbitration case (PCA 2012-2, UNCITRAL), many community leaders 
refused to dialogue directly with the Ecuadorean mining exploration company (a local subsidiary held by a 
Canadian parent), demanding instead to speak with government officials.  
65 It should be noted that a company’s local-level CSR operations might be transferable to another firm in 
similar fashion. The role that freely transferable CSR operations may play in aggravating or potentially 
alleviating company-community conflicts deserves further scrutiny. 
66 See Human Rights Council, Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (OEIGWG), Legally Binding 
Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, OEIGWG Chairmanship Revised Draft (16 July 2019).  
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Business and Human Rights by governments and businesses alike.67 It is far beyond the 
scope of this chapter to state exactly how to resolve this ongoing debate. Its purpose has 
been to clarify how the global and transnational dimension of corporate responsibility 
stands in relation to the legal accountability void that is constitutive of the transnational 
legal order. Today, corporate responsibility, as the ethical responsibility of flesh-and-
blood decision makers, runs all the way from the lowest-level subsidiary to the apex of 
the multinational corporate group. When all is said and done, it implicates the very 
people who assert a legal claim to the residual value generated by the enterprise, the 
flesh-and-blood shareholders and the ultimate investors.  
 
																																																								
67 “Access to Remedy” comprises the third pillar of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (supra note 1, Principles 25–31).  
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